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Regardless of race, gender, ethnicity, or socioeconomic status, all persons care deeply 
about where they live.  The basic right to housing is something all persons deserve and the 
Implied Warranty of Habitability adds further protections by requiring all leased properties to be 
fit for human habitation, with running water and adequate heat in the winter.1 This is important 
because, outside of work, home is where individuals spend most of their time; therefore, not only 
is housing essential, it is imperative that individuals feel at home and are able to contribute to 
their neighborhood and broader community.2  But, building a home and ties within a community 
takes time, especially for those with fewer resources.  During the time it takes to settle into a 
neighborhood, the neighborhood could change; real estate developers could build luxury rentals 
while city developers revitalize long-standing communities.  This sort of rapid development is 
not without its costs. Instead, this leads to hasty gentrification in which the cost of living 
increases at such a rate that individuals are priced out of the very same communities they are 
building.3  Thus, creating and maintaining affordable housing is a public necessity and has been 
recognized as a national crisis, in need of immediate improvement.4  Affordable housing is not 
 
1 Assemb. 4610, 2017 Leg., 217th Sess. (N.J. 2017); see also Community Service Society, Your Rights as a Tenant 
in New York State, https://www.cssny.org/campaigns/entry/help-fix-our-rent-laws#know-your-rights-faq (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2019). 
2 U.S. Dep’t of Lab., American Time Use Survey – 2018 Results, USDL-19-1003, 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/atus.pdf. 
3 Individuals who are priced out of their communities primarily refers to renters. While the value of homes and 
property taxes will proportionately increase to reflect bourgeoning markets, rental properties have the most reactive 
and drastic spikes in cost of living.  
4 Mark Zandi, What actions can policymakers take to avert the brewing national housing crisis?, Wash. Post (Jan. 3, 




subsidized housing; rather, affordable housing is defined as housing that costs less than thirty 
percent of a household’s gross monthly income.5  This number is adjusted for household size and 
takes into the cost of utilities.6  
Since developers will seek to maximize their profit in emerging communities, states have 
utilized rent control as a way to solve the affordable housing crisis.7  Rent control is a 
government regulation that is designed to keep housing affordable and to maintain its supply.8  
Yet, rent control is not commonly utilized throughout the United States.  Only 182 United States 
municipalities out of 89,000 have rent control regulations.9  To further narrow the scope of rent 
control, only four states have municipalities with rent control provisions in place.10  New York is 
one of the four states and New York’s next-door neighbor, New Jersey, is another.11  
New York has a long history of housing regulations and, often, it has come in the form of 
rent control.12  Most recently, the New York legislature passed the Housing Stability and Tenant 
Protection Act of 2019 (HSTPA), sweeping legislation that is designed to increase affordable 
housing in New York and to protect tenants.13  HSTPA is worthy of applause for its increased 
tenant protections.  Except, to solve the problem of affordable housing, HSTPA repeals vacancy 
deregulations and makes rent regulations permanent.14  Both actions have consequences with a 
high probability of frustrating landlords as well as their tenants.  Landlords will be frustrated 
 
5 Housing and Community Development Network of New Jersey, Developing Effective Municipal Housing Plans 
(May 2015), https://www.hcdnnj.org/assets/documents/coah_decisionreport_061715.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 
2019)[hereinafter HCDNNJ]. 
6 Id. 
7 Walter Block, Rent Control, The Library of Econ. and Liberty, 
https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/RentControl.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2019). 
8 Investopedia, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/rent-control.asp (last visited Sept. 19, 2019). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. (Listing the four states with rent control: New York, New Jersey, Maryland, California). 
11 Id. 
12 Guy McPherson, Note, It’s the End of the World as We Know It (And I Feel Fine): Rent Regulation in New York 
City and the Unanswered Questions of Market and Society, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1125 (2004). 
13 Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019, 2019 N.Y. Laws 36 [hereinafter HSTPA]. 
14 HSTPA, 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, Part D. 
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because they will have less control of their profits. Since housing is a livelihood for many 
landlords, they will respond to this financial frustration with a lower incentive to improve the 
value of their properties.15  As a result, tenants will become frustrated and upset as the quality of 
their housing steadily declines.16  
Across the Hudson River from New York is New Jersey with its own rules and 
regulations regarding affordable housing.  New Jersey has extensive rent control provisions in 
100 municipalities, including Newark and Jersey City, two of its most populous communities.17  
Interestingly, these two cities are located in counties, Essex and Hudson, respectively, that hold  
the upsetting lead for having the highest percentage of the state’s homelessness population.18  
One reason for this is due to an extreme shortage of affordable housing.19  Therefore, while rent 
control may help provide affordable housing to those who are able to secure it, it is proving not 
to be enough for all those who need it.  With more individuals electing to rent instead of own, 
there is an increased demand for rental housing across income levels.20  As a result of increased 
demand, the housing market reacted by amplifying the overall cost of rent, pricing out more than 
 
15 Rebecca Diamond ET. AL., The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: 
Evidence from San Francisco, Stanford University (Mar. 4, 2019), https://web.stanford.edu/~diamondr/DMQ.pdf. 
16 Id. 
17 New Jersey Department of Community Affairs, 2009 Rent Control Survey, 
https://www.nj.gov/dca/divisions/codes/publications/pdf_lti/rnt_cntrl_srvy_2009.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2019); 
Sen-Yuan Wu, 2013 Population Estimates for New Jersey, NJ Labor Market Views (July 18, 2014), 
https://www.nj.gov/labor/lpa/pub/lmv/LMV_29.pdf. 
18 2017 New Jersey Point-In-Time Count Fact Sheet, Monarch Housing Associates, 
https://cdn.monarchhousing.org/wp-content/uploads/njcounts17/NJCounts2017ExecutiveSummary.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2019); see also New Jersey’s 2017 Point-in-Time Count of the Homeless, Monarch Housing Associates 
(Jan. 24, 2017), https://cdn.monarchhousing.org/wp-content/uploads/njcounts17/2017PITReportStatewide.pdf. 
19 Colleen O’Dea, Shortage of Affordable Housing Explored at NJ Spotlight on Cities, NJSpotlight.com, 
https://www.njspotlight.com/2016/10/16-10-19-chronic-shortage-of-affordable-housing-explored-at-nj-spotlight-on-
cities/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2019). 





low-income urban dwellers.  Therefore, New Jersey needs to think more creatively on how to 
solve its housing crisis. 
Like New York, New Jersey has a long history of legislative actions to address the 
housing crisis.  Most noteworthy is New Jersey’s Mount Laurel Doctrine,21 a judicially-enforced 
interpretation of the New Jersey State Constitution that requires towns to use their zoning powers 
in such a way that will increase the availability of affordable housing. This constitutional 
obligation was codified in the Fair Housing Act.22  But, this doctrine has been met with fierce 
resistance and has not been strictly enforced.23  Because enforcement of this doctrine has been 
ineffective, New Jersey needs a new template to create the affordable housing that is so 
desperately needed. New York’s HSTPA can provide a template for that reform in terms of the 
strict parameters it sets to improve landlord-tenant relations.24  Still, New Jersey should not rely 
on rent control as a solution.  Instead, New Jersey should require municipalities to effectively 
utilize their land by creating a system of equity and through inclusionary zoning.25  For this 
reason, among many others, this comment will argue that rent control is not a viable solution to 
New Jersey’s shortage of affordable housing. 
In Part I, this comment will begin by providing foundational information on rent control.  
Then, this comment will discuss New York’s sweeping legislation, HSTPA, as well as their 
efforts for economic inclusion.  The advantages and potential drawbacks will be included.  In 
Part II, this comment will explore the history and development of affordable housing regulations 
 
21 S. Burlington County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (1975). 
22 Fair Housing Act, N.J. Stat. § 52:27D-301 (1985). 
23 Salvador Rizzo, N.J. Supreme Court ramps up towns' affordable housing obligations, NorthJersey.com (Jan. 18, 
2017, 11:36 AM), https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/new-jersey/2017/01/18/nj-supreme-court-ramps-up-
towns-affordable-housing-obligations/96712760/. 
24 HSTPA, 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, Part M. 
25 What is Inclusionary Housing?, Inclusionary Housing, http://inclusionaryhousing.org/inclusionary-housing-
explained/what-is-inclusionary-housing/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2019). 
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in New Jersey.  A report on the severe state of the rental crisis in New Jersey will be discussed.  
In Part III, this comment will argue that New Jersey should use New York’s HSTPA as a 
template for its landlord-tenant reform only; New Jersey should not adopt the extensive rent 
regulations.  Instead, this comment will propose a market-based solution, grounded in 
inclusionary zoning, and a statutory model to guide New Jersey towns in this effort.  
Part I: Rent Control & the Effects of New York’s HSTPA & Economic Inclusion Efforts 
a. What is rent control? 
 Rent control is a government-driven limitation on the amount of rent a landlord may 
charge a tenant.26  Since World War I, rent control measures have been enacted to address 
housing shortages.27  Today’s modern rent control laws relate to a body of restrictions that are 
instituted to combat inflation-based rent increases and to keep housing costs affordable for low-
income residents.28 
 Rent control is found in four states (California, Maryland, New Jersey, New York) and 
the District of Columbia.29  In order for a state municipality to control rent, they must be 
authorized to do so.30  Rent control is seen seldomly because most of the remaining forty-six 
states have adopted legislation that either prohibits or preempts rent control.31  But, for states 
with rent controls in place, most rent control provisions will include a method to determine the 
base rate and to calculate future adjustments.32  By incorporating the price of future increases, 
this formula provides landlords with a reasonable return on their investment.33  Nevertheless, 
 
26 5 Thompson on Real Property, Thomas Editions § 43.04 [hereinafter Thompson]. 
27 McPherson, supra note 12. 
28 Thompson, supra note 27.  
29 National Multifamily Housing Council, Rent Control Laws by State, https://www.nmhc.org/research-
insight/analysis-and-guidance/rent-control-laws-by-state/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2019). 
30 Thompson, supra note 27.  
31 Thompson, supra note 27.  
32 Thompson, supra note 27.  
33 Thompson, supra note 27.  
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rent control can be far-reaching if it includes other parameters related to evictions, vacancies, and 
the like.34  For these reasons, rent control has been historically controversial.35  
Advocates argue that rent control is a necessary measure to combat housing shortages 
while opponents argue that rent control improperly adjusts a market-based allocation of 
resources.36  For example, the median price for a one-bedroom apartment in New York City was 
$3,070 in 2018; however, there are still over 1.4 million renting households who pay more than 
thirty-five percent of their monthly income towards rent.37  These figures demonstrate that rent 
control does not work and economists, across party lines, agree.38  Economists argue that rent 
control ignores the most influential factor for ever-rising rent prices: a shortage of affordable 
housing.39  Furthermore, rent control is not specific to an income threshold; therefore, inability to 
pay market-based rents is not a qualifier for affordable housing tenancy.40  A well-to-do 
entrepreneur has an equal opportunity of securing a rent-controlled apartment as a single mother 
living below the poverty line.  This is wrong and contrary to the entire premise of rent control.  
Thus, this comment will continue to relate back to the position that affordable housing should not 
be a race to sign a lease; the vacancies belong to those who will otherwise be displaced and 
pushed away from opportunities. 
 
34 Thompson, supra note 27.  
35 Thompson, supra note 27.  
36 Thompson, supra note 27. 
37 Selected Housing Characteristics: 2017: ACS 5-Year Estimates Data Profiles, United States Census Bureau, 
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?d=ACS%205-
Year%20Estimates%20Data%20Profiles&table=DP04&tid=ACSDP5Y2017.DP04&g=0400000US36_1600000US3
651000&lastDisplayedRow=60 (last visited Nov. 13, 2019); see also Investopedia, supra note 8. 
38 IMG Chicago, Rent Control Forum (Feb. 7, 2012, 8:08 AM), http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/rent-
control?mod=article_inline; see also Editorial, Bernie’s National Rent Control, Wall St. J. (Sept. 29, 2019, 3:41 
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bernies-national-rent-control-11569786061?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=2. 
39 National Multifamily Housing Council, The High Cost of Rent Control, https://www.nmhc.org/news/articles/the-
high-cost-of-rent-control/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2019); see also Editorial, supra note 39 (reporting only 2% of 
economists think rent control has positive effects). 
40 James Fanelli, Rent-Stabilized Apartments Are Being Occupied by Millionaires, Records Show, DNAInfo.com, 
https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20140430/new-york-city/rent-stabilized-apartments-are-being-occupied-by-
millionaires-records-show (last visited Sept. 19, 2019). 
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b. New York’s Housing Stability & Tenant Protection Act of 2019 (June 14, 2019, Senate Bill 
S.6458) 
New York’s most recent legislation has been inundated with controversy because of its 
sweeping rent control reform.41  Opponents argue that these controls will ultimately dissuade real 
estate investors and, consequently, amplify the affordable housing shortage that HSTPA was 
designed to alleviate.42  This legislation is state-wide; however, this comment will focus on facts 
related to New York City since HSTPA’s effects to renters is the cornerstone of this comment. 
New York City is unique.  It is the most populated city in the United States with over 
eight million people and three million households.43  Two-thirds of these households are rentals, 
half of which are rent-stabilized.44  Renting is the most prevalent form of housing because the 
median price of a home in New York City is one million dollars.45  This exorbitant price for 
home ownership, coupled with a $60,000 median annual income, leads individuals, not just 
towards renting, but towards securing housing at the best possible price.46  Furthermore, because 
salaries do not increase at the same rate as rental prices, rent-stabilized tenants generally renew 
 
41 See e.g., Cooper Smith, Second Lawsuit Challenges Controversial Rent Rules, The Cooperator (Jan. 17, 2020), 
https://cooperator.com/article/second-lawsuit-challenges-controversial-rent-rules.  
42 Thompson, supra note 27. 
43 Devon Thorsby, The Biggest Cities in the U.S., U.S. News (Aug. 14, 2019, 11:30 AM), 
https://realestate.usnews.com/real-estate/slideshows/the-biggest-cities-in-the-us?slide=26; see also New York City 
and Boroughs, 2010, Table SF1-P5 NYC: Total Households by Household and Family Type, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/planning-level/nyc-population/census2010/t_sf1_p5_nyc.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2019). 
44 Where We Live, Explore Data: Housing Conditions, https://wherewelive.cityofnewyork.us/explore-data/housing-
conditions/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2019); Luis Ferré-Sadurní, Live in a Regulated Apartment? New York City Just 
Decided Your Rent, N.Y. Times (June 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/25/nyregion/new-rent-laws-
nyc.html. 
45 Jennifer Gould Keil and Bruce Golding, Manhattan Home Prices in ‘Near Free Fall’ as Median Dips below $1M, 
N.Y. Post (Oct. 2, 2019, 9:46 PM), https://nypost.com/2019/10/02/manhattan-home-prices-in-near-free-fall-as-
median-dips-below-1m/; Amy Plitt, Rent vs. buy? More New Yorkers go with the former—here’s why, Curbed New 
York (Feb. 21, 2019, 4:21 PM), https://ny.curbed.com/2019/2/21/18235208/new-york-apartment-rent-vs-buy-
survey. 
46 QuickFacts: New York City, New York, United States Census Bureau, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/newyorkcitynewyork/PST040218 (last visited Nov. 13, 2019); New 
York City Median Household Income 2017 Estimates, Baruch College, 
https://www.baruch.cuny.edu/nycdata/income-taxes/med_hhold_income.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2019). 
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their leases year after year.47  But, while long-term tenants continue to reap the benefits of rent 
control, the shortage of affordable housing intensifies.  To enter the New York City housing 
market, individuals are either (1) fortunate to secure a rarely-available rent-stabilized unit or (2) 
searching within the other half of rentals, which are market based.  This latter situation will lead 
renters to pay inflated market-based pries because the rental supply remains fixed while the 
demand is ever-increasing.48 
Gentrification accelerates the housing demand and HSTPA is New York’s legislative 
response to combat the effects of gentrification and to address the consequent increased cost of 
housing. Gentrification is not narrowly defined as a low-income neighborhood seeing its first 
Starbucks; rather, “gentrification is the transition of a community from low-income or working-
class status to middle-class or affluent status, largely through in-migration.”49 Although 
gentrification can be analyzed through several different lenses (i.e. demographics, crime rate, 
etc.), this comment will specifically focus on gentrified areas in which there was an excessively 
high change in rent over a short period of time.50  Out of 55 New York City neighborhoods, 15 
are considered to be “gentrifying.”51  One of these neighborhoods is Bushwick, Brooklyn, a 
community that saw a forty-four percent increase in rent.52  For NYC as a whole, the percent 
change in average rent from 1990 to 2010-2014 was over twenty-two percent.53  Yet, some 
 
47 Tom Streithorse, Why Your Rent Is So High and Your Pay Is So Low, Los Angeles Rev. of Books (Aug. 4, 2015), 
https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/why-your-rent-is-so-high-and-your-pay-is-so-low-tom-streithorst/. 
48 Bryan T. Mohler and Rachel E. Shaw, Impact of the New NYC Rent Law on Landlords and Tenants, law.com: 
N.Y Law J. (July 9, 2019, 2:52 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/07/09/impact-of-the-new-nyc-
rent-law-on-landlords-and-tenants/. 
49 Pete Saunders, How To Understand Gentrification, Forbes (Aug. 29, 2016, 12:35 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/petesaunders1/2016/08/29/understanding-gentrification/#5107c7635ec6.  
50 Id. 






neighborhoods far exceeded Bushwick’s increase; Brooklyn’s Williamsburg & Greenpoint 
neighborhoods have rentals with monthly costs that increased as high as seventy-eight percent.54 
Gentrification often occurs against the backdrop of economic development. Therefore, 
housing regulation should focus on encouraging continued economic development, which has 
positive impacts on a community, while ensuing those with low incomes are not priced out of 
their homes. Development within a gentrifying neighborhood could bring economic diversity, 
new neighborhood amenities, improved parks, and reduced crime.55  Nevertheless, when rent 
rises in such a manner that long-term residents are pushed out, the neighborhood will quickly 
lose its diversity and become a neighborhood only for those who can afford the skyrocketed rent 
price.  For example, although NYC’s gentrifying neighborhoods saw new apartment buildings 
quickly built, the corresponding demand for these neighborhoods meant that property owners 
could receive higher rents.  Therefore, despite the number of apartments increasing during the 
period of gentrification, the supply of affordable housing diminished significantly.56 Thus, 
HSTPA’s goal is to keep more units within the rent regulation system through codifying rent 
stabilization and rent control laws.57  HSTPA accomplishes this through four primary 
regulations. 
First, HSTPA repeals vacancy and income deregulation.58  In other words, landlords will 
not be able to increase the rents upon vacancy and there will be limits on how much a landlord is 
able to charge.59  Prior to HSTPA, a landlord could increase a unit’s rent to a market-based rate 
 
54 Id. 
55 Emily Chong, Examining the Negative Effects of Gentrification, Georgetown Law (Sept. 17, 2017), 
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/poverty-journal/blog/examining-the-negative-impacts-of-gentrification/; The 
Kinder Institute, Who's Really Getting the Benefit? The Impact of Gentrification on Health (Sept. 29, 2017), 
https://kinder.rice.edu/2017/09/29/whos-really-getting-the-benefit-the-impact-of-gentrification-on-health. 
56 Kinney, supra note 52. 
57 HSTPA, 2019 N.Y. Laws 36. 




upon vacancy.60  Post HSTPA, the apartment’s rent is permanently regulated, regardless of the 
cost of rent or the tenant’s income61  This will be especially controversial for landlords who have 
granted tenants preferential rents.  In this scenario, tenants pay below the legally registered rent 
until the time for lease renewal, when the landlord surges the monthly rent.62  But, landlords 
cannot continue this practice moving forward.  Instead, the preferential rent will establish the 
base rent for subsequent rent increases.63  This new policy has two primary consequences.  First, 
it permanently ends the possibility for one-third of NYC’s rentals to enter the market-based 
rental market.  Second, it increases the likelihood that rent-stabilized tenants will renew their 
leases, triggering the cost for market rate units to grossly magnify.  Thus, this provision, 
although designed to maintain the supply of affordable housing, effectively diminishes the 
availability of affordable housing while increasing the rental price for market rate units.  
Secondly, HSPTA restricts the amount a property owner may increase rent upon lease 
renewal.64  Since landlords will be limited in the amount they can increase their rent, landlords 
will be less willing to make improvements.  Previously, Individual Apartment Improvements 
(IAIs) allowed property owners to increase rent based upon improvements made to individual 
apartments.65  This arrangement could be a positive for tenants who would enjoy an improved 
quality of living without having to move.  But, HSTPA caps IAIs at $15,000 for every 15 
years.66  This equates to less than $90 per month for improvements; however, in an urban city, 
 
60 N.Y Div. of Hous. and Cmty. Renewal, Fact Sheet: #26 Guide to Rent Increases for Rent Stabilized Apartments 
(Oct. 2019), https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/10/fact-sheet-26.pdf. 
61 HSTPA, 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, Part A. 
62 N.Y Div. of Hous. and Cmty. Renewal, Fact Sheet: #40 Preferential Rents (Sept. 2019), 
https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/09/FACT%20SHEET%2040.pdf. 
63 HSTPA, 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, Part E. 
64 Id. at Part H. 




this is an unworkable amount for most projects.67  Thus, this HSTPA provision is an unexpected 
burden to property owners who completed IAIs and planned to recover their investment by 
increasing rent, upwards of $500 per month.68  HSTPA also revised the allowable rent increase 
for Major Capital Improvements (MCIs).69  MCIs allow landlords to increase rents for major 
projects, such as a building’s roof replacement.70  But, contrary to IAIs, MCIs permanently 
increase a rental unit’s cost of rent.  MCIs were historically exploited for this reason; therefore, 
they are now capped at two percent instead of six percent.71 
Thirdly, HSTPA limits security deposits to the equivalent of one month’s rent.72  This 
provision prevents discriminatory housing practices by preventing landlords from requiring two, 
or more, month’s rent upfront in order to identify low-income renters.73  But, this provision may 
still hurt tenants who do not have good credit history or high income.74  For example, it is not 
uncommon to find a rent listing, for a rent-stabilized unit in New York City, that requires the 
tenant’s income to be 40x greater than the monthly rent.75  This starkly contrasts with making 
 
67 Blaine Z. Schwadel, Legal Viewpoints: What you need to know about NYCʼs new rent regulations, Real Estate 
Weekly (July 11, 2019), https://rew-online.com/2019/07/legal-viewpoints-what-you-need-to-know-about-
nyc%CA%BCs-new-rent-regulations/. 
68 Ass’n for Neighborhood and Hous. Dev., How Widespread is Abuse of the Individual Apartment Improvement 
Increase Loophole?, https://anhd.org/report/how-widespread-abuse-individual-apartment-improvement-increase-
loophole (last visited Nov. 14, 2019). 
69 HSTPA, 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, Part K. 
70 Oksana Mironova and Jeff Jones, Closing the Loopholes, Community Service Society (May 2019), https://smhttp-
ssl-58547.nexcesscdn.net/nycss/images/uploads/pubs/rent_loopholes_FINAL_for_web.pdf. 
71 HSTPA, 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, Part K. 
72 Id. at Part M. 
73 The Office of Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor Cuomo Announces Comprehensive Proposal in FY 2020 
Executive Budget to Increase Access to Housing (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-
cuomo-announces-comprehensive-proposal-fy-2020-executive-budget-increase-access. 
74 Sarina Trangle, Tenant housing court history could become a protected class under city bill, amNY.com, 
https://www.amny.com/real-estate/nyc-tenant-blacklist-ban-1.36511535/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2019). 




affordable housing accessible because it is not uncommon for individuals to spend one-third of 
their income on rent.76  Thus, landlords remain capable of screening out low-income dwellers. 
But then again, HSTPA combats this potential to discriminate through its expansive 
tenant rights.  Prior to HSTPA, a landlord could convert a rental building to a condo or co-op if 
fifteen percent of the tenants in occupancy, or bona fide purchasers, agreed to buy.77  HSTPA 
complicates this “demolition loophole” by significantly increasing the bar and requiring fifty-one 
percent of tenants to agree to purchase.78  By requiring a majority of tenants to participate in the 
conversion, HSTPA protects tenants from involuntary displacement while preserving the supply 
of affordable housing units. 
Lastly, HSTPA contains a robust regulation that transforms tenant rights, with respect to 
all rental units, including both regulated and market rate.79  While HSTPA’s provisions on 
landlord-tenant law are expansive, two are specifically related to rent control and the availability, 
or lack thereof, of affordable housing.  The first is positive while the latter could have unintended 
consequences.  
First, HSTPA prevents tenant blacklisting.80  Historically, any tenant who had a past 
proceeding or nonpayment within the housing court was placed on a report, better known as the 
“blacklist”, which was ultimately sold to landlords.81  However, the blacklist includes individuals 
 
76 The Pew Charitable Trusts, American Families Face a Growing Rent Burden (Apr. 2018), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2018/04/rent-burden_report_v2.pdf; see also Ronda Kaysen, How much of 
my income should be budgeted for rent, N.Y. Times (Oct. 18, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/23/realestate/how-much-of-my-income-should-be-budgeted-for-rent.html (noting 
that 38% of tenants nationally pay over 30% of their pre-tax income on rent; 17% are extremely rent-burdened, 
paying more than 50% of their pre-tax income on rent). 
77 HSTPA, 2019 N.Y. Laws 36, Part N. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at part M 
80 Id. 
81 LEGALEase: The Use of Tenant Screening Reports and Tenant Blacklisting, N.Y State Bar Ass’n, 
https://www.nysba.org/TenantLE/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2019). 
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who legally withheld rent due to uninhabitable living conditions or who won their cases.82  Yet, 
the presence of a blacklist created an entire business of tenant screening.  When a landlord found 
a potential renter on the blacklist, the landlord denied the applicant tenancy regardless of the 
reasoning or outcome of the case on the record.83  By HSTPA repealing this practice, there will 
be more tenants looking to secure housing in areas they were previously denied. 
Secondly, HSTPA increases the notice required for eviction proceedings.84  Instead of 
receiving three days of notice, tenants are required to receive 14 days of notice.85  If an eviction 
violates these terms, it is illegal and may be prosecuted as a misdemeanor.86  While this eviction 
provision is tenant-friendly, it increases a landlord’s exposure and vulnerability.  Thus, this could 
ultimately hurt lower-income rentals because landlords will choose to rent only to those that are 
well to do, thereby hurting populations such as lower income classes, recent graduates, and 
immigrants.87  Since HSTPA also requires landlords to mitigate damages if a tenant vacates an 
apartment prior to the lease expiration, HSTPA subliminally encourages landlords to choose the 
lowest-risk renter.88  Unfortunately, landlords are likely to discriminate by equating low-risk 
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c. HSTPA’s effects on landlords, tenants and NYC: The loopholes are never closed. 
 
Although HSTPA’s provisions are strict in theory, the provisions need to be obeyed and 
enforced in order for HSTPA to achieve its goals.  But, landlords will not be self-policing 
officers and enforce New York’s HSTPA.  Instead, landlords will rely on tenants being unaware 
of their rights or that the new legislation has even been passed.90  In addition, landlords will look 
for creative loopholes to secure their once-had liberties.91  For example, if HSTPA’s provisions 
are strictly followed, then this means that landlords will either (1) make repairs and have a lower 
profit margin or (2) make only necessary repairs to protect their profit margin.  The latter is most 
likely.  Since landlords cannot pass the same cost of MCIs or IAIs to their tenants, landlords will 
simply do less.  Although they will still need to comply with the Implied Warranty of 
Habitability (IWH), HSTPA will “encourage minimal compliance at best.”92  
This may affect the number of individuals who are able to survive in the rental business.93  
Landlords and property owners of large apartment buildings may be able to skirt around the new 
regulations due to their size and monthly revenue.  But, smaller landlords may be forced out of 
the business if they cannot afford to maintain their units due to their inability to raise rents 
proportionate to their increased expenses.94  Furthermore, the inability to deregulate buildings 
could cause overall property values to go down.95  This will eventually lead to lower sales prices 
and, consequently, to lower tax revenue.96  
 
90 Valeria Ricciulli, How NYC landlords may be skirting the new rent laws, Curbed New York (Sept. 4, 2019, 3:09 
PM), https://ny.curbed.com/2019/9/4/20835833/new-york-rent-stabilization-laws-tenants-landlords-nyc. 
91 Id. 
92 Id.; see also NY Real Prop L § 235-B (2014) (defining the Implied Warranty of Habitability). 
93 Will Parker and Konrad Putzier, New York Landlords in a Financial Bind From New Rent Law, Wall St. J. (June 
24, 2019, 10:50 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-landlords-in-a-financial-bind-from-new-rent-law-
11561201200. 
94 Mohler, supra note 49. 
95 Parker, supra note 94. 
96 Mohler, supra note 49. 
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Declining sale prices is a red flag for developers, who will become disincentivized from 
participating in the NYC market.97  If less developers enter the market, the aggregate supply of 
apartments will be unable to meet the ever-increasing demand for NYC housing.98  Thus, 
HSTPA further injures the housing shortage because there will be less apartments overall.  Since 
the rent-regulated apartments do not have an income threshold, upper-income tenants will 
continue to occupy many of the rent-regulated apartments.99  These tenants will be highly 
unlikely to vacate their apartments because, if they do so, they will need to pay market-based 
rent.  Moreover, current rent-regulated tenants received a huge windfall from the passing of 
HSTPA.100  Their worries about conversions via the demolition loophole or increases due to IAIs 
or MCIs have vanished.  Meanwhile, worries have skyrocketed from those who are waiting for a 
vacancy.101  The free market rents continue to increase along with the public housing waitlists, 
which are already too long.102 
 
d. Affordable housing in New York is not a lost cause. 
 
Fortunately, HSTPA is not the only affordable housing plan in place. Mayor Bill de 
Blasio’s Housing New York (HNY) has financed more than 122,000 affordable apartments for 
New York City’s low-income residents since 2014.103  In addition to financing new construction 
 
97 See, e.g., Ed Kalikow, There are certain uncertainties a developer just canʼt live with, Real Estate Weekly (Nov. 
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supra note 41. 
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for affordable housing, HNY also has a strict plan for New York’s unused public land and 
mandates inclusionary housing.104 
Since the original 2014 HNY plan was successful and ahead of schedule, HNY 2.0 
provides an expanded set of goals to accomplish by 2026.105  There are two HNY goals that 
directly steer New York City towards a better and more thoughtful use of land.  First, the vacant 
land tax provision charges a higher rate of tax on undeveloped land until in-demand housing is 
built.106  Second, HNY mandates inclusionary housing in new developments.107  HNY requires 
that areas rezoned for residential development include twenty to thirty percent of permanently 
affordable apartments.108  Therefore, this effectively closes the demolition loophole.  While 
HSTPA complicates the loophole by requiring fifty-one percent of tenants to purchase in order to 
allow for co-op conversions, HNY does not provide this practice as a remote option for 
landowners.109  Even if seventy-five percent of tenants would like to convert their units to 
condominiums, they would be unable to do so.  This ensures an increased and safeguarded 
supply of affordable housing.  Thus, in comparison to HSTPA, HNY’s goals and strategies are 
commendable and will be included in the recommended plan for New Jersey.  But, HNY will 
need to amplify its goals to meet New York City’s affordable housing needs post-HSTPA.  
In conclusion, the rent control provisions of HSTPA will further the housing shortage.  
Individuals, including members of the upper class, will not leave a coveted apartment to move 
into a market-rate apartment.  Since World War II, New York City’s vacancy rate has remained 
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below five percent; therefore, it is unlikely to improve with HSTPA’s strict changes.110  
Therefore, New York City will continue to absorb its housing shortage through homelessness 
and through room sharing.111 Although HNY will soften HSTPA’s effects on low-income 
dwellers, it is unlikely to provide enough housing to absorb the negative consequences from 
HSTPA.  While New York’s leadership is focused on improving affordable housing, their 
approach does not constitute an effective model for other states, such as New Jersey. 
II. New Jersey’s Housing Shortage Despite Mount Laurel & Rent Control Efforts 
 
New Jersey is known as the Garden State because of its history of providing produce to 
its city neighbors, New York and Philadelphia.112  Although, while its name may have a 
historical component, New Jersey is not as bountiful as the “garden state” reference suggests.  
Albeit the second wealthiest state, New Jersey is also the sixth most expensive state to live.113  
The cost of living considers the price for groceries, utilities, healthcare, and gas; however, the 
cost of housing is the biggest factor.114  Therefore, the demand for affordable housing is ever-
present for New Jersey residents.  
a. What makes New Jersey Unique? 
 
Although New Jersey has areas of sprawling acreage, New Jersey has a high percentage 
of renters.  Out of New Jersey’s nine million residents, or 3.2 million households, thirty-six 
 
110 William Tucker, Policy Analysis No. 274: How Rent Control Drives out Affordable Housing, Cato Institute (May 
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Investopedia.com (Sept. 29, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/101015/10-wealthiest-states-
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percent are renting.115  Unfortunately, renting is extremely costly for New Jersey residents; fifty-
one percent of renter-occupied units are spending thirty percent or more of their household 
income on rent and utilities.116  Therefore, based on the parameters set for affordable housing, 
these individuals are considered rent-burdened.117  Rent-burdened is not a classification unique 
to low-income households; eighteen percent of middle income renters fall within this category 
because of the extremely high cost of rent. 118  This is unsurprising considering the annual 
household income needed to afford a two bedroom apartment, at fair market rent, is 
approximately $60,000 while the average median income for renters is only $46,696.119  But, 
twenty-six percent of renter households are considered extremely low-income, earning a 
maximum of $29,270 annually.120 Unfortunately, fifty-four percent of these extremely low-
income renters are either seniors or disabled.121  Therefore, across varying income levels and 
demographics, there is a shortage of affordable housing.  For extremely low earners alone, there 
is a need for an additional 200,000 affordable homes.122 
b. New Jersey’s Initiatives to Provide Affordable Housing 
 
Similar to New York, New Jersey has a rich history of legislation and provisions in place 
to combat the demand for affordable housing.  The Mount Laurel Doctrine and Jersey City’s 
Rent Control are two of the garden state’s current strategies that will be analyzed.123  
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i. The Mount Laurel Doctrine: Alive Yet Contested 
The Mount Laurel Doctrine was derived from a line of cases arising out of Mount Laurel 
Township in Burlington County, New Jersey.  In the 1960s, Mount Laurel Township experienced 
rapid growth and its suburbanization forced out tenured black communities.124  After attempts to 
provide affordable housing were blocked by township governance, a series of litigation arose.125  
Due to New Jersey Supreme Court’s landmark decisions, Mount Laurel I and Mount Laurel II,126 
the Mount Laurel Doctrine remains alive. 
The Mount Laurel Doctrine states that municipalities have a Constitutional obligation to 
use their zoning power in a manner that creates low- and moderate-income housing.127  The New 
Jersey Council on Affordable Housing (COAH) was enacted to make sure housing regulations 
were implemented, but COAH failed to comply with court orders and was declared defunct in 
2015.128  From 1999 to 2015, also known as the “gap period”, over 300 declaratory judgments 
arose while the judicial forum considered how to remedy affordable housing issues from 
COAH’s second round of regulations.129 
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In 2017, New Jersey’s Supreme Court took middle ground on issues surrounding COAH 
and reaffirmed the Mount Laurel mandate in Mount Laurel V.130  This mandate requires 
municipalities to consider their “present need” for affordable housing.131  If a municipality did 
not take any action from 1999, then their past needs must be included as part of their “present” 
calculation.132  But, the mandate falls short by not providing any specific guidance on the method 
of implementation.133  This ambiguity has afforded municipalities with an unwarranted leniency 
and left many questions unanswered.  Thus, it is now up to the New Jersey legislature to 
determine how to reform affordable housing requirements. 
 Today, New Jersey municipalities continue to calculate their respective needs for 
affordable housing based on Mount Laurel V.  The ruling allows developers, as well as low- and 
moderate-income residents, to judicially challenge any municipality that is believed to not have 
made a “fair share” of affordable housing available.134  But, this is not simple because New 
Jersey is a home rule state.135  Home rule permits local governments to pass laws and ordinances 
as they see fit for their municipality.136  Therefore, many municipalities still fight the 2017 New 
Jersey Supreme Court Decision.137  
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For example, Bergen County’s Englewood Cliffs has not built a single affordable housing 
unit in over forty years.138  This municipality has strongly and publicly resisted the Mount Laurel 
Doctrine.  The Mayor has noted that he respects the Mount Laurel I decision from 1976 for 
putting an end to housing discrimination.139  Yet, he opposes subsequent Mount Laurel decisions 
because he argues that it is a redistribution of property under the color of law and in violation of 
New Jersey’s home rule.140  This type of noncompliance with the Mt. Laurel mandate has 
consequences. 
Englewood Cliffs is an example of how towns that do not comply with the Mount Laurel 
doctrine are vulnerable to the use and exploitation of builder’s remedy lawsuits.  A builder’s 
remedy lawsuit is a suit that a developer may bring if they believe the town has not provided its 
fair share of affordable housing or is practicing exclusionary zoning.141  If the developer has a 
successful suit, the court will permit the developer to build housing at a higher density.  But, as 
with any judicial action, these remedies take time.  For instance, Englewood Cliffs continues to 
resist a developer’s suit that was first filed in 2015.142  Therefore, while builder’s remedy suits 
may eventually alleviate a municipality’s affordable housing shortages, it is not enough and not 
soon enough.  Furthermore, it is a builder’s remedy, not a solution; the Mount Laurel II court 
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ii. Rent Control Initiatives in New Jersey Have Failed 
Local rent controls laws are common in New Jersey’s largest cities.144  New Jersey 
Courts support these efforts and step in when necessary to ensure that landlords are not skirting 
ordinances and charging tenants for anything other than the cost of rent.  For example, Opex 
Realty Mgmt LLC v. Taylor145 prevents landlords from passing late fees, attorney’s fees, and 
other costs to their rent-controlled tenants under the guise of “additional rent.”  The ruling 
explains that additional rent cannot be collected because, when combined with the monthly cost 
of rent, the total rent would exceed the maximum allowable rent under rent control.146  But, even 
with the support from New Jersey courts, rent control has largely failed as an initiative to create 
or better affordable housing.  
Jersey City, the garden state’s second largest municipality, has New Jersey’s strictest 
rent-control laws.147  Although Jersey City has seen an immense amount of development in 
recent years, there are a significant number of long term residents who can no longer afford the 
cost of gentrification.148  Jersey City’s stringent rent controls are designed to keep housing 
affordable for Jersey City renters, twenty-five percent of which are spending more than fifty 
percent of their monthly income on rent.149  As part of its restrictions, this Hudson County 
municipality does not allow any vacancy decontrol, preventing landlords from adjusting rent 
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between tenants.150  Additionally, Jersey City landlords are required to provide new renters a 
copy of the base rent at the time of inception as well as the rent of the previous tenant.151  Unlike 
New York, Jersey City tenants are also entitled to a statement from their landlord, showing that 
the rent complies with rent control.152  This statement is essential to providing the tenant with 
confirmation that the landlord is compliant with Jersey City’s rent control laws.  If a tenant does 
not receive that statement, then their landlord may be in violation without any penalization.153  
Jersey City successfully created over 1,100 affordable apartments through their rent 
control ordinance; however, due to lack of proper enforcement, their rent control system has 
failed.154  Despite disallowing vacancy decontrol, Jersey City’s halfhearted enforcement led 
landlords to test the boundaries.155  Unfortunately for tenants, their landlords quickly learned 
they could escape the strict rent control regulations.156  When Jersey City evaluated their current 
rent control ordinances, they found five key findings, which collectively showed how their rent 
control strategy was grossly unsuccessful.157 
First, rent control provides the largest source of affordable housing in Jersey City.158  Out 
of 2887 affordable housing units, 1152 were rent controlled while only 240 were provided 
through public housing.159  Second, tenants lack education; at least fifty percent of tenants did 
not know they were living in rent-controlled apartments.160  Although a “rental statement” from 
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the landlord was required to inform the tenant of their rent control protections, many tenants did 
not have any information on their rights.161  Therefore, this rental statement was provided, at 
best, half of the times that it should have been.162  Additionally, this rental statement was also 
required to provide the new tenant with the price of the previous tenant’s rent.163  Yet, in 
practice, only six percent of residents surveyed said they were aware of the previous tenant’s 
rent.164  This knowledge gap between landlords and their rent-controlled tenants afforded 
landlords more latitude to unlawfully increase rental prices between tenants, or during lease 
renewals. 
Related to the lack of tenant education, the third finding is that landlords knowingly 
disregarded the rules and regulations of Jersey City’s rent control program.165  Jersey City 
mandated every rent-controlled landlord to submit a “Landlord Registration Statement”, also 
known as a “rent roll”, to document the rent per apartment as well as the rent change over 
time.166  A “rent roll” is not unique to Jersey City; many cities across the U.S. utilize this record 
to detect red flags and landlords who are acting in bad faith.167  But, this technique only works if 
enforced.  Knowing compliance was not strictly enforced, Jersey City landlords were bold 
enough to block off disclosure requirements with a Sharpie while others submitted entirely blank 
forms.168  Over time, Jersey City’s apathy allowed rent rolls to conceal the crushing rent 
increases that were taking place. 
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Unfortunately, the fourth finding is that longtime residents have been displaced because 
“the rent is too damn high.”169  Since landlords were able to evade the rent control system, over 
fifty percent of rentals were no longer affordable.170  The high turnover rate in rent controlled 
apartments further suggests that landlords were impermissibly raising their rents on unsuspecting 
new tenants.  Approximately one in five tenants had moved to their apartments less than two 
years ago.171  This is the complete opposite of New York City where the vacancy rate is 
extremely low.172  When a new tenant entered a rent-controlled apartment in Jersey City, they 
were asked to pay rents anywhere from twelve to forty-four percent higher than the previous 
tenants.173  This led to glaring discrepancies among neighbors.  In one building, a tenant was 
paying $770 per month while his newest neighbor was paying $1880.174  Since landlords have 
consistently omitted fields in their rent rolls, there is no documentation to explain why rents 
increased at such swallowing rates.  Nevertheless, this system has undeniably permitted 
landlords to increase their profits significantly.175  
Last, but likely not least, Jersey City found that the “demolition loophole” permanently 
removes affordable housing.176  By demolishing a building, a landlord could permanently 
remove rent control restrictions and build market-rent units.177  Although landowners need to 
receive permission from the Zoning Board prior to approval, landowners are met with less 
resistance when there is little documentation on the rent-controlled residences. 
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Although Jersey City is only one municipality out of 100 in New Jersey, the stark 
findings demonstrate that rent control is not a viable solution.  Jersey City, the New Jersey 
municipality with the strictest regulations, has seen displacement, exploitation, and further 
shortages.  If rent control could cause these consequences under the strictest standards, then rent 
control is a methodology that should be sunset.  Jersey City has proposed that rent control 
regulations demand closer oversights and additional compliance checkpoints; however, this 
leaves the promise and future of affordable housing in the hands of a few .178  Jersey City, along 
with other rent-controlled municipalities, should reconsider basic economic principles and 
introduce inclusionary zoning. 
III.  Solutions for New Jersey: Mount Laurel & the Market 
 
New Jersey’s rich history from the Mount Laurel doctrine provides a starting point for 
affordable housing reform.  The Mount Laurel Doctrine is grounded in New Jersey’s State 
Constitution and decrees each municipality’s obligation to provide their fair share of affordable 
housing.179  But, for this prescribed responsibility to come to fruition, there needs to be a 
statutory model to guide municipalities as they plan how to meet their Mount Laurel obligations.  
This guide must accommodate the unique needs of municipalities while providing direction on 
how to move towards inclusivity.  
This section of the comment will offer a template for New Jersey’s affordable housing 
reform based upon lessons learned from New York City and Jersey City.  First, this section will 
summarize why New Jersey should borrow little from New York: adopting only HSTPA’s key 
landlord-tenant protections and HNY’s inclusionary zoning.  Next, this section will discuss how 
New Jersey can incorporate inclusionary zoning into the Mount Laurel mandate.  The overall 
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solution will address the motivations of landlords and municipalities alike.  Since it has been 
argued that strict rent regulations do not work, perhaps the opposite, neighborliness and better 
land use, will. 
a. What New Jersey Should Borrow from Next-Door Neighbor, New York 
Affordable housing will never be created if there is not cooperation among stakeholders.  
Therefore, as a whole, New York’s HSTPA is not recommended for New Jersey.  Since passed 
in June 2019, HSTPA has been met with resistance across party lines in terms of how the 
regulations will impact the market value and quality of New York’s housing market.  This 
concern is due to the fact that HSTPA is far-reaching legislation, immediately disturbing the 
housing market in terms of supply and demand.  HSTPA fixes the supply without providing any 
incentives for landlords to contribute further.180  Instead, it obligates landlords to overcome 
additional regulatory barriers, which are already toeing the line of being cost prohibitive.  For 
example, the National Association of Home Builders has calculated that thirty percent of the cost 
to build a multifamily development is spent on regulations.181  While some of these regulations 
may be necessary from health and safety perspectives, others may be mere boondoggles, 
unreasonably increasing the financial burden while negatively impacting the speed at which the 
housing supply can increase.  Thus, strict regulations alone will not cure the inadequate supply of 
affordable housing. 
Additionally, HSTPA’s rent regulations are void of any parameters to address the 
motivations of NYC landlords.  Instead, HSTPA’s suffocating limitations on MCIs or IAIs will 
demotivate landlords from improving the housing for current or future tenants.182  Without a 
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foreseeable return on their investment, landlords will seek to do the bare minimum while 
remaining in compliance with HSTPA.  Moreover, it is also unlikely landlords will invest in 
developments that increase the supply of affordable housing when their profit-margins are 
permanently capped. 
With a severe shortage of affordable housing, there is only one option: states must create 
more housing.  It is not enough to merely regulate and stabilize the current supply.  Rather, it is 
necessary for municipalities to secure developers to build additional affordable housing to 
prevent displacement from rising rent prices.  In order for developers to be part of this solution, 
they need to be part of the equation.  HSTPA’s new rules treat all landlords as if they are 
invariably corrupt and incapable of participating in an inclusive solution.  Alternatively, New 
Jersey should move towards collaboration.  This comment’s proposed plan for New Jersey will 
include incentives for developers to team with New Jersey’s municipalities.  Therefore, New 
Jersey should not adopt the expansive rent regulations that New York’s HSTPA outlines.  
Nonetheless, HSTPA’s landlord-tenant protections are commendable and should be 
incorporated into New Jersey’s reformed housing model.  New Jersey should improve their 
housing model by including: (1) an eviction procedure that mirrors the timeline outlined in 
HSTPA, (2) a one-month maximum for security deposits, and (3) a statewide ban on tenant 
blacklists.183  When making these changes, it is critical for all renters to be informed of the 
changes and their associated tenant rights.  The reason for this is because education matters. 
When tenants are more aware of their rights, they will be equipped with the requisite knowledge 
to advocate for themselves.  This helps further the legislature’s goals and holds more individuals 
accountable for housing reform’s success than the municipalities alone.  
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Alternatively, without awareness of their rights and protections, tenants become 
vulnerable to landlords who illegally raise rent or patronize their tenants with self-help remedies.  
This, in turn, leads to a downward spiral in which tenants are displaced and municipal courts are 
flooded with eviction claims.  As seen in Jersey City, more than fifty percent of renters were 
unaware that they were living in a rent-controlled apartment.184  Ultimately, this led a strict rent 
control system towards failure; therefore, tenant education does not only make a difference, it is 
essential.  In Jersey City’s final report, they list proactive outreach to tenants as a 
recommendation for improvement.185  While this may not be the complete solution to tenant 
education, it is a beginning. 
Lastly, New Jersey should consider Mayor de Blasio’s creative HNY initiatives.  By 
thinking outside traditional solutions such as rent control, HNY has been successful in creating 
additional affordable housing.  HNY 2.0 announces that 200,000 additional affordable housing 
units will be available by 2022, two years ahead of the original timeline.186  HNY 2.0 focuses on 
inclusionary zoning, requiring that buildings and areas, rezoned for growth, include twenty to 
thirty percent of permanently affordable apartments.187  In addition, HNY directly addresses the 
motivations for landlords who want to make a profit through the implementation of a Vacant 
Land Tax.188  This strategy imposes a heightened tax rate on lots that remain vacant until the 
much-needed housing is built.189  HNY 2.0 does not require developers to build only affordable 
housing; rather, it suggests that increasing the overall supply of housing is beneficial.  This 
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strategy allows for open communication between state legislators and developers as opposed to 
one-way communication via regulations. 
b. Continuing the Mount Laurel Legacy by Addressing the Motivations & Creating Incentives 
 The Mount Laurel Doctrine is a powerful constitutional interpretation for New Jersey to 
help remedy the affordable housing shortage.  Some towns have fully committed to the 
doctrine’s goals, resisted the threat of builder’s remedies, and have created their fair share of 
affordable housing.190  Yet, the opposition to the doctrine remains alive despite the years that 
have passed since the landmark decision.  Therefore, this doctrine must be refined with more 
guidelines for municipalities. 
As it currently stands, municipalities have the autonomy to determine how they will 
provide their fair share of affordable housing.  But, instead of builders relying on higher density 
remedies through builder’s remedy suits, the municipalities should promote neighborliness by 
working together.  It is important for New Jersey to consider reframing the Mount Laurel 
Doctrine within the context of inclusionary zoning as opposed to simply mandating more 
housing.  While additional housing is needed, it is important for the affordable housing to be 
built in urban areas where there is also access to public transportation.  This will place 
individuals near opportunity as opposed to distancing rent-burdened households from the 
positive effects of development and gentrification.191  New Jersey can work towards this by 
leveraging the strategies that are outlined in New York’s HNY model.  For example, New Jersey 
could charge higher taxes for land that sits idle.  In addition, New Jersey could make public 
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unused land available by providing financial incentives for builders to create additional 
affordable housing units. 
In addition to revising the guidance for municipalities to adopt the Mount Laurel 
doctrine, it is also important for New Jersey to intentionally address the motivations.  Addressing 
the motivations requires municipalities to consider their own goals along with developers.  As 
New Jersey determines how to protect their tenants and maintain affordable housing, they should 
consider what will motivate developers to do the same.  The following ideas are to be further 
studied and contemplated as a guide for New Jersey municipalities: 
 Create a system of equity: There are good tenants with bad landlords and there are bad 
tenants with good landlords.  Tenants need a process for recourse while landlords need a 
viable recourse that does not include: tenant blacklisting, self-help evictions, or 
retaliation.  New York’s HSTPA can provide a template for these landlord-tenant 
protections. 
 Limit the luxury market: Motivate municipalities to create a demand for affordable and 
attainable housing by limiting the luxury market.  In areas where there is a severe 
shortage of affordable housing, municipalities will be encouraged to cap the number of 
luxury rentals that can enter the market in a given year.  For example, in Jersey City, this 
could be a solution for the municipality to recover from its failed system of rent control.  
Municipalities may encourage developers to contribute to the affordable housing supply 
by providing tax incentives. 
 Motivate Tenants & Landlords to maintain their property: This strategy involves 
addressing the motivations of landlords and tenants alike.  Landlords need to be 
motivated to invest in affordable housing while tenants need to be motivated to take care 
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of their property.  This symbiotic motivation can be addressed by encouraging property 
maintenance from landlords and tenants to dismantle the not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) 
perception that has persisted.192  A potential solution is to fix the price of rent for a 
certain period if tenants maintain their property.  This encourages individuals to take care 
of their homes and will also encourage long-term tenants, benefitting neighborhoods in 
turn.  Landlords will benefit from less turnover and will be able to protect their fair 
market return without increasing rent. 
 Inclusionary Zoning: Municipalities should not hurry gentrification.  New Jersey’s home 
rule provides broad latitude for towns to plan their use of land as they see fit.  Therefore, 
by refraining from rushed development, New Jersey municipalities can engage in 
thoughtful and inclusionary land planning.  This approach will prevent the displacement 
of long-term residents while simultaneously allowing a town to grow and develop.  
Furthermore, by integrating affordable and market-rate units, towns may create 
opportunities for households with diverse socioeconomic backgrounds to have access to 
the same community resources as their neighbors.193  As discussed, rent control has 




Rent control is not a solution to the affordable housing shortage.  While rent control, as a 
concept, may be reasonable to preserve affordable housing, its regulations and reliance on 
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municipal enforcement render it far less viable.  Therefore, an inclusive solution to our 
affordable housing shortage is necessary.  This solution encompasses protections for both 
landlords and tenants along with inclusionary zoning and tax incentives. 
As mentioned above, stringent regulations, such as New York’s HSTPA, do not motivate 
landlords to improve their property or to enhance their tenant’s quality of living.  Rather, HSTPA 
has fixed the landlords’ possible profit, which incentivizes landlords to creatively cut costs 
through other means.  The Implied Warranty of Habitability (IWH) will provide baseline 
protections for tenants.194  For example, IWH will not permit a landlord to remit rent from a 
tenant who is not receiving adequate heat or running water.195  Except, IWH’s threshold should 
not be barely met because a landlord is seeking a reasonable return on their investment.  Thus, as 
New Jersey municipalities think about affordable housing, they should also think about the 
effects of regulations on the same individuals who are contributing to the affordable housing 
supply.  This consideration will foster additional housing that is both affordable and attainable.  
Thus, in conclusion, collaboration and kindness is needed to solve New Jersey’s affordable 
housing crisis.  Towns and developers must work together to create a community, a 
neighborhood, for all.  
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